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Abstract and Keywords
Foreign and defence policy overlap in most countries, and India is no exception. This 
chapter traces the origins of India’s national security policies and discusses key turning 
points. It argues that the first major shift in the country’s defence policies took place in 
the immediate aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. In the wake of this conflict 
the country embarked upon a substantial program of military modernization. It also fo­
cuses on a series of extant threats that the country confronts, the policies and strategies 
that have been adopted to address them, and their limitations and prospects. The chapter 
also addresses the question of India’s military industrial base and its shortcomings. The 
final section focuses on the key challenges that confront the country and are likely to 
shape the course of its national security policies.
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The Legacies of Colonialism and Partition
INDIA’S emergence in the global order was part of the early wave of the European decol­
onization process. It came about both as a consequence of the growth of the Indian na­
tionalist movement as well as the inability of the United Kingdom to sustain colonial rule 
in the wake of its exhaustion as a consequence of the ravages of the Second World War. 
The country also became independent at a time when the fleeting and exigent coopera­
tion between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Second World War came 
to a close and the international order witnessed the beginning of the Cold War. As early 
as July 1947, a month before India’s independence, the noted American diplomat George 
Kennan had pseudonymously published his famous article, ‘The Sources of Soviet Con­
duct’, a document that would soon become the intellectual basis of the US strategy of 
containment directed against possible Soviet expansionism.
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Deft Pakistani diplomacy designed solely to balance India’s greater capabilities, and a 
perceived threat, helped focus American attention on the region. The forging of the US– 
Pakistan alliance in 1954 was to have significant adverse consequences for India’s nation­
al security and would also contribute to the estrangement of the two countries (McMahon 
1996).
It is important to underscore this politico-strategic backdrop because it had a significant 
impact on the evolution of India’s security policies. The United States, focused on possi­
ble Soviet designs on Western Europe and East Asia, paid scant attention to India. The 
Soviets, still under Stalin’s grip, saw India through the lens of a doctrinaire ideology, and 
thereby attached little significance to the country in their strategic calculations (Donald­
son 1974). Indeed, it was not until his demise that his successors shifted their perspective 
on India’s position in the Cold War international order.
(p. 146) At a national level, it is virtually impossible to discuss the genesis of India’s secu­
rity policies without taking into account the role of the British colonial heritage and the 
impact of the Partition of India. Furthermore, as recent scholarship has revealed, British 
hostility toward India had important and deleterious consequences for India especially 
because of British machinations in favor of Pakistan on the vexed question of the status of 
the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (Dasgupta 2002).
Finally, and as many commentators have discussed at length, few individuals had as much 
of an impact on the shaping of post-independence India’s foreign and security policies as 
its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. In the absence of a significant cohort of individ­
uals in the Indian Cabinet who had substantial knowledge of and experience with interna­
tional affairs, Nehru swiftly emerged as primus inter pares. Consequently, his imprint on 
India’s foreign and security policies was considerable from the very outset.
Contrary to some recent assessments, Nehru’s vision of global order, enshrined in the 
adoption of a policy of non-alignment, was not merely a deft, instrumental strategy. In­
stead it reflected his deep-seated beliefs about global order. Indeed, a perusal of his writ­
ings on international politics supports such a conclusion (Nehru 2011). Nehru, who pur­
sued an ideational foreign policy, had visions of fundamentally transforming the global or­
der. Such an order would promote decolonization and self-determination, hobble the use 
of force in international politics, boost universal nuclear disarmament, and reduce global 
inequalities.
The Persistence of Key Security Challenges
External Threats
It is intriguing to note that the key national security challenges that India confronted af­
ter independence, though not identical, have remained somewhat constant. Three such 
subjects merit discussion: two of them are external and one domestic. The external 
threats emanate from Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The internal 
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threat, which has metamorphosed over the decades through multiple manifestations, in­
volves both ethnic and class differences that pose a challenge to India’s national integrity 
and cohesion.
The most immediate national security threats that it faced emanated from Pakistan, 
which advanced an irredentist claim to the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Ganguly 2001). 
After three wars (1947–8, 1965, and 1999) and multiple crises, Pakistan is no closer to­
ward the realization of its goal. Nevertheless, it has far from abandoned its claim to the 
state and has, at least since the 1980s, resorted to an asymmetric war strategy to raise 
for India the costs of keeping the portion of the state that it currently controls (Swami 
(p. 147) 2006). Furthermore, Pakistan’s overt acquisition of nuclear weapons shortly after 
India’s decision to cross that Rubicon may have effectively limited the prospects of full- 
scale war (Ganguly 2008). However, it may have also created conducive conditions for the 
pursuit of limited incursions in non-vital regions to test India’s resolve and capabilities. In 
considerable measure, the Kargil War of 1999 may be deemed to be such a ‘limited 
probe’ (George and Smoke 1974).
Despite multiple attempts to engage Pakistan in the wake of the Kargil War, even after 
two subsequent crises in 2001–2 and then again in 2008, little progress has been made 
toward reaching any rapprochement. Indeed, in 2013 clashes ensued once again along 
the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto international border, in Kashmir (Bedi 2013d).
A second source of threat, that from the People’s Republic of China was perhaps not as 
immediately apparent in the immediate post-independence era. Furthermore, Prime Min­
ister Nehru had sought to fashion a policy of appeasement to try and avoid a conflict with 
Indian’s northern colossus.1 Though neither leader was willing to militarily confront the 
PRC, the lack of Indian military preparedness proved quite disastrous when the PRC 
launched an attack on India’s Himalayan borders in 1962 (Palit 1992). Shortly thereafter, 
the PRC moved to forge a closer strategic relationship with Pakistan. In many ways this 
was cemented when Pakistan conceded a section of the disputed state of Jammu and 
Kashmir to the PRC in 1963 (Garver 2001). Furthermore, the PRC acquisition of nuclear 
weapons in 1964 spurred India to pursue a nuclear option as early as 1966 under the 
aegis of the Subterranean Nuclear Explosions Project (Ganguly 2010).
Despite multiple efforts under various regimes in New Delhi to settle the border dispute, 
the progress on this front has been glacial. Also, apart from the closeness of the Sino-Pak­
istani relationship and the PRC’s involvement in and support for the Pakistani nuclear 
weapons program, Sino-Indian relations remain fraught. Three issues, in particular, con­
tinue to dog the relationship. The first, of course, involves the unresolved border dispute 
and the PRC’s willingness to periodically shift its stance on its territorial claims and re­
sort to probes along the disputed border. The second stems from the presence and activi­
ties of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal leader of the Tibetan exile community 
in India. Finally, the PRC remains unreconciled to India’s status as a nuclear weapons 
state. This was evident from its hostility toward granting India an exemption from the 
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rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group when the US–India civilian nuclear agreement was 
about to be consummated in 2008.
Internal Threats
The final national security threat that India confronts stems from within. In the wake of 
independence, its policy-makers were faced with the daunting task of national integra­
tion. The nascent government handled this task with remarkable ease and with a mini­
mum use of force (Menon 1955).2 Subsequently, it faced rebellions in India’s northeast 
but proved able to contain if not wholly suppress them through an amalgam of force and 
limited concessions. Later, in considerable part thanks to the shortcomings of its (p. 148)
own federal structure as well as dubious choices on the part of its policy-makers, most no­
tably Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the country saw the rise of an ethnic, secessionist in­
surgency in the Punjab (Telford 1992). Later, after a long period of uninterrupted peace, 
an insurrection also erupted in the Indian-controlled segment of the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The origins of this uprising could also be traced to domestic sources. However, 
within months of its outbreak Pakistan’s security establishment chose to enter the fray 
turning an internal conflict into a externally supported, religiously charged extortion 
racket (Ganguly 1997).
The Indian state managed to crush the Punjab insurgency using a rather harsh counter- 
insurgency strategy. It has also managed to restore a modicum of order if not the rule of 
law in Kashmir (Ganguly and Fidler 2013). Though the underlying grievances were not, 
for the most part, addressed in the Punjab, a likely recrudescence of the insurgency there 
is unlikely. In Kashmir, however, the Indian state still faces a deep reservoir of discontent 
and also cannot escape the possibilities of continued Pakistani interference.
Finally, two sources of domestic violence now dog India. First, the country has seen the 
renewal of Maoist violence across a significant swath of the country and the emergence 
of domestic Islamist terror in particular parts thereof. The roots of this Maoist revival are 
complex and beyond the scope of this chapter (Lalwani 2011). Suffice it to say that it 
stems from a congeries of factors including the poor quality of governance in various 
parts of the country, expanding economic disparities, and the mobilization of extant griev­
ances. How the Indian state chooses to respond to this resurgence of Maoist activity will, 
in considerable measure, determine its future. Thus far, its responses have been piece­
meal, sporadic, and, in large measure, uncoordinated. Of course, India’s federal struc­
ture, to some degree, hobbles the possibility of fashioning a wholly coherent response.
Second, the emergence of domestic Islamist terror also poses a problem to India’s politi­
cal order. Once again, the specific origins of the genesis of Islamist violence in India are 
well beyond the scope of this analysis. There is some evidence, however, that it can be 
traced to persistent perceptions of discrimination amongst a younger generation of Indi­
an Muslims, their increased political awareness, and also the possible impact of the 
pogrom that took place in Gujarat in February 2002. The most radical of these is the Indi­
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an mujahidin who have been deemed to be responsible for a number of terror attacks 
across the country (Ahuja 2013).
The challenge that this form of radical Islamist violence poses to the Indian polity cannot 
be understated. If allowed to fester, it could have significant adverse consequences for 
the body politic. It might enable external powers, most notably Pakistan, to continue to 
exacerbate existing social fissures. Furthermore, even in the absence of foreign involve­
ment and interference, the persistence of such rents in the social fabric of a poly-ethnic 
state are inherently undesirable as it constitutes a fundamental basis for social unrest.
A strategy that simply seeks to repress these organizations and most notably the Indian 
mujahidin, is unlikely to succeed. Instead, any attempt to deal with these terrorist (p. 149)
groups must involve a two-pronged approach. At one level, this will obviously involve 
careful intelligence collection, prompt investigation of attacks, and swift prosecution of 
the perpetrators. At another, it will require the Indian state to also address underlying 
grievances that have led to this turn toward the resort to terror.
Capabilities and Their Limitations
Given these security challenges what are the extant military capabilities of the Indian 
state? How has it sought to deploy these assets to cope with the present threats? Finally, 
what are the principal constraints that it confronts in bringing its resources toward meet­
ing these pressures? The coercive power of the Indian state is considerable and a far cry 
from the days when it lacked the ability to effectively deal with a range of external 
threats to its territorial integrity.
The current military capabilities of the Indian state are considerable. According to infor­
mation in the public domain it has 870 combat aircraft, 21 surface combatant vessels, 15 
submarine vessels, and over 3,000 main battle tanks. It also has 1,325,000 military per­
sonnel and almost an equal number of paramilitary forces (International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 2013). Beyond these human and material capabilities, it also has a very 
substantial military industrial base. It has 39 ordnance factories, nine Defense Public Sec­
tor Undertakings, and a network of 52 high-technology research establishments under 
the aegis of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
However, despite the size of the military-industrial infrastructure, its actual performance 
has been quite uneven. As a number of scholars and analysts have highlighted, it has suf­
fered from vast cost overruns, it has failed to meet stated targets on a number of occa­
sions, and is not subject to careful, rigorous, dispassionate external scrutiny (Behera 
2013). Consequently, despite a long-professed commitment to self-reliance in the arena of 
weapons acquisitions, the country remains acutely dependent on a range of foreign sup­
pliers for a range of weaponry to equip its armed forces (Kumar 2012).
Among other matters, the country has long struggled to develop an indigenous Light 
Combat Aircraft. Indeed, it was three decades after the project was launched that it was 
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finally flight tested in April 2013 (Menon 2013). Though touted as an indigenous aircraft, 
General Electric engines power both its versions (Bedi 2013c). Furthermore, its radar, 
weapons systems, and other key components are also of foreign origin. As of early 2013, 
the aircraft had yet to receive full operational clearance; a designation that means that it 
has received the requisite approval to carry weaponry. India’s experience in developing a 
military transport aircraft, Saras, has not been salutary. Of the two test aircraft that were 
built, the second crashed in 2009 killing all three personnel on board. The efforts at indig­
enization once again have been far from exemplary as the engine is from Pratt and Whit­
ney of Canada (Francis and Menon 2013).
The problems with this aircraft unfortunately are emblematic of what ails much of India’s 
sprawling defense industrial sector. Indian strategic commentators routinely (p. 150) ex­
hort policy-makers to reduce the country’s dependence on foreign suppliers of weaponry. 
A committee that an important player in India’s defense science establishment and subse­
quent president, A. P. J. Kalam, had headed in the mid-1990s had called for reducing the 
foreign content of weaponry from 70 to 30 per cent by 2005. However, as of 2013, the fig­
ure remained at 70 per cent (M. Joshi 2013). In the foreseeable future, it is hard to envis­
age how India might be able to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers given the per­
sistent inability of its domestic military industrial base to meet extant needs on a timely 
and cost-effective basis.
Policies and Strategies
To cope with the threat from the PRC, India has deployed twelve mountain divisions along 
its Himalayan border. The threat to India is compelling and has been underscored as a 
consequence of a number of statements emanating from high-level sources as well as re­
cent border incidents. India’s strategy, as can be discerned from its border deployments, 
appears to be a combination of a strategy of deterrence through denial and punishment 
(Snyder 1961).
Along the Himalayan border, India’s military deployments, its road improvement efforts, 
and its creation of a new military base equipped with Sukhoi-30 aircraft in Tezpur, Assam, 
all suggest that in terms of immediate deterrence of the PRC India’s military planners 
have chosen a strategy of denial (Kashyap 2007). In June of 2013, India’s Ministry of Fi­
nance gave the nod for the development of a mountain strike corps of around 90,000 
troops which would be deployed along the disputed border with the PRC. This approval 
came in the wake of an incident in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had pene­
trated and set up camp 19 kilometers within the Line of Actual Control in mid-April of 
2013. The PLA forces had withdrawn from the Dapsang Valley only after extensive diplo­
matic negotiations and a tense three-week standoff with the Indian army (Bedi 2013b). 
These preparations are under way despite New Delhi’s unwillingness to ratchet up its 
public rhetoric when dealing with the PRC on the fraught question of the resolution of the 
border dispute.
India’s National Security
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In pursuit of a form of more general deterrence of the PRC, India is steadily investing in 
long-range missile capabilities that can strike significant portions of southern China. In 
fact, the Agni V missile that is currently under development should not only be able to 
target significant sections of the PRC but is apparently designed to carry multiple war­
heads (Keck 2013). This Indian deterrent capability is mostly designed to counter the 
PRC’s substantial air capabilities in Tibet including five all-weather airfields. Also, accord­
ing to a reliable source, the PRC apparently has an undisclosed number of Dong Feng-3 
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in Tibet which are targeted at India (Bedi 2013a).
Furthermore, the Sino-Indian competition is starting to extend well beyond the disputed 
border and spilling over into India’s immediate neighborhood. Through a deft (p. 151)
amalgam of diplomatic initiatives, economic incentives, and security arrangements the 
PRC has made significant inroads into all of India’s neighbors. These developments go 
well beyond the ‘all weather’ friendship that the PRC has long enjoyed with Pakistan 
(Sender 2013).
Additionally, a degree of naval competition, at least in incipient form, is now emerging in 
the Indian Ocean as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) seeks to extend the reach 
of its capabilities. It is unlikely that this will abate any time in the foreseeable future. In­
stead, if the PLAN ramps up its activity and the PLA continues to exert pressure on 
India’s land borders in the Himalayan region, there is every reason to believe that Indian 
naval planners will seek to broaden and deepen the scope of their current naval coopera­
tion with Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan. These states, as well as various others in North- 
East and South-East Asia entertain significant and growing anxieties about the PLAN’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea and beyond. Furthermore, a number of them have 
important maritime boundary disputes with the PRC. Consequently, enhancing naval co­
operation with India provides a useful hedge against the PLAN’s ability and willingness to 
flex its capabilities in the region.
India’s willingness to enter the fray reflects some ambivalence. Obviously, its policy-mak­
ers do not want to get drawn into a regional maritime conflict far from its shores. Howev­
er, as prominent Indian commentators have argued, it is nevertheless willing to demon­
strate that it has the requisite naval capabilities to reassure its new-found friends in 
South-East Asia (Mohan 2013).
In addition to these states, India has also sought to forge a viable diplomatic relationship 
with South Korea, a state that it had mostly neglected during much of the Cold War era. 
However, over the course of the past decade India has successfully managed to fashion a 
multi-faceted relationship with South Korea. Though neither side sees this relationship as 
a mechanism for containing the PRC, both have common interest in promoting bilateral 
trade and investment and, from a strategic standpoint, in keeping a close watch on the 
Pakistani–North Korean clandestine nuclear weapons network (Brewster 2010).
Though conducted without much fanfare, India has extended its naval reach into the 
South China Sea. According to analysts who have some familiarity with and knowledge of 
these Indian naval deployments, India’s efforts stem from a combination of both geoeco­
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nomic and geostrategic interests. Specifically, it appears that India’s interest in operating 
in these waters stems from its quest for reliable energy resources especially off the 
coastal areas of Vietnam, to ensure safe and uninterrupted passage of its ships involved 
in seaborne trade, and to deny the PRC from asserting any unilateral sway over the re­
gion. These interests, from an Indian standpoint, neatly converge because as much as 55 
per cent of India’s trade takes place through the choke point of the Straits of Malacca and 
to and from the region of the South China Sea (Scott 2013).
Over the past decade India has sought to engage Pakistan despite incontrovertible evi­
dence of the Pakistani state’s involvement with terror. The results of these efforts, howev­
er, have been far from encouraging. Multiple rounds of talks have not resulted in (p. 152)
any concrete, tangible results and it is far from clear that continuing discussions will lead 
to better outcomes.
In June 2013, following Nawaz Sharif’s election as Prime Minister of Pakistan, hopes in 
India rose of some possible improvement in relations. Subsequent developments, howev­
er, have belied these expectations. It is apparent that despite the emergence of a legiti­
mately elected civilian regime, it is in no position to make any credible commitments to 
New Delhi. For all practical purposes, the military establishment remains primus inter 
pares within the Pakistani state and is not about to relinquish its stranglehold over key 
foreign and security policy issues. Consequently, it is hardly much of a surprise that the 
newly elected civilian regime has been hamstrung from undertaking any meaningful ini­
tiatives to reduce tensions let alone terminate the rivalry with India. In the absence of an 
endogenous or exogenous shock that fundamentally alters the status of the Pakistani mili­
tary establishment within the political milieu of the country, it is hard to envisage how a 
breakthrough might emerge in Indo-Pakistani relations.
Given the asymmetry in military capabilities between the two states, and one that is likely 
to widen in the future, especially if India can sustain a respectable level of economic 
growth, it is hardly surprising that the Pakistani military establishment has come to rely 
on the use of terrorist proxies to inflict significant costs on India (Swami 2006). Despite 
various efforts, the Indian state, given its many domestic vulnerabilities, has been unable 
to devise an effective defensive or deterrent strategy to thwart this strategy.
Its defensive efforts along the LoC including the building of a fence have proven unsuc­
cessful in stopping infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir (Swami 2004). Nor has it been 
able to wholly secure its vast coastline even after the horrific terrorist attack on Mumbai 
in November 2008 (Polgreen and Bajaj 2009). Consequently, it does not have what is re­
ferred to as a strategy of defense through denial. Unfortunately, it has not been able to 
devise a coherent strategy of defense through punishment or retaliation either. In the 
wake of the 2001–2 crisis when the country came perilously close to war with Pakistan, it 
had sought to fashion a military strategy known as ‘Cold Start’ designed to carry out a 
limited, swift, sharp retaliatory response in the event of a Pakistan-based terrorist attack 
on Indian soil. However, as one analyst has argued, the actual ability to implement this 
strategy has been hamstrung as a consequence of organizational pathologies and inade­
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quate planning (Ladwig 2007–2008). Furthermore, at least one chief of staff of the Indian 
army has stated that the doctrine does not formally exist (Pubby 2010).
India’s policy-makers may have concluded that carrying out this strategy could be fraught 
with considerable risk. Given Pakistan’s stated nuclear doctrine, which calls for a rapid 
nuclear escalation in the event of a sudden Indian conventional attack, the possibility of 
the outbreak of a nuclear war is indeed substantial. Pakistan’s continuing investment in 
the development of tactical nuclear weapons further enhances the dangers of a nuclear 
war stemming from an Indian conventional attack (S. Joshi 2013). Given that Pakistan’s 
nuclear doctrine and capabilities can undermine India’s limited war doctrine, it is reason­
able to surmise that India has sought to invest in the development of ballistic (p. 153) mis­
sile defense capabilities to trump Pakistan’s nuclear use plans. With such a shield in 
place, especially in battlefield circumstances, India could significantly attenuate, if not 
wholly eliminate, the consequences of any early Pakistani resort to the use of tactical nu­
clear weapons. It could then resort to an overwhelming strike against Pakistan with its 
nuclear arsenal largely intact.
Such a strategy, though understandable from the Indian standpoint, is nevertheless un­
likely to work. Pakistan, in all likelihood, will not only seek to ramp up the production of 
its tactical nuclear weapons but will also seek to place them on mobile launchers, dis­
perse them across the country, and resort to both camouflage and deception. Such choic­
es would not only undermine the utility of India’s costly investments in ballistic missile 
defense but could very possibly unravel its strategy of escalation dominance (Topy­
chkanov 2012).
Apart from this troubled bilateral relationship, India’s national security interests in the 
region are also likely to be affected quite dramatically as the International Security Assis­
tance Force, under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, winds down its 
presence and operations in Afghanistan. India’s strategists and diplomatic corps well re­
alize that Pakistan’s security establishment will, no doubt, seek to undermine India’s 
hard-won political presence and economic interests in the country.
The Nuclear Gyre
Apart from conventional threats, the country also needs to cope with two nuclear-armed 
neighbors. Since the overt acquisition of nuclear weapons, India’s policy-makers publicly 
stated that the country sought to pursue a strategy of ‘minimum credible 
deterrence’ (Bastur 2006). Despite this stated commitment to the pursuit of such a strate­
gy, India’s actual programs and deployments suggest otherwise.
The creation of a strategic triad composed of long-range nuclear capable aircraft, a suite 
of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a submarine-based force 
goes well beyond the needs of a finite deterrent strategy. More to the point, the country’s 
increasing investment in ballistic missiles defenses in conjunction with a set of robust 
ICBM capabilities could have significant adverse consequences for both strategic stability 
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and crisis management (Kampani 2013). Furthermore, as some knowledgeable commen­
tators have argued, despite the creation of a Strategic Forces Command, the operational 
dimensions of India’s nuclear forces still face a number of serious organizational prob­
lems. Among other matters the control of the nuclear warheads are still divided between 
two civilian scientific agencies: the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and the DRDO. Si­
multaneously, the three armed services remain in charge of the relevant combat aircraft, 
naval assets, and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. In addition to this organizational 
anomaly, concerns persist about the actual material infrastructure of India’s nuclear as­
sets. These include, but (p. 154) are not limited to, secure communication networks, re­
dundant command and control nodes, safe storage and suitable hideouts for the nuclear 
force, and reliable transport infrastructure for the secure mobility of warheads, fissile 
cores, and delivery vehicles (Kampani 2013: 116).
Beyond Immediate Threats
Strategic Links with the US
Apart from coping with the threats from Pakistan and the PRC, India’s policy-makers have 
yet to reach a working consensus on the contours of a strategic relationship with the 
United States. Reaching such an understanding may be quite significant for the future of 
India’s national security. Unfortunately, three forces cast a cloud over any attempt to 
reach a clear-cut understanding on what might constitute such a working strategic part­
nership with the United States.
First, at an international level, there is little question that the ‘shadow of the past’ contin­
ues to dog the relationship. During the Cold War, as is well known, the two sides were fre­
quently at odds. India was of little or no strategic significance to the United States and 
was often treated with a mixture of disdain and disregard. India, of course, had success­
fully fashioned a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union and this, in turn, had blight­
ed any prospect of strategic convergence with the United States.
Second, and stemming from this strategic disjuncture, India’s policy-makers were dis­
mayed at the fitful support for Pakistan during the Cold War. Some instances of American 
support for Pakistan had seriously impinged upon India’s security interests. Even after 
the Cold War’s termination and a marked transformation of Indo-US strategic ties, the US 
relationship with Pakistan continues to rankle in New Delhi. Specifically, despite much 
discussion, the two sides cannot seem to find common ground about how best to deal 
with the Pakistani military establishment’s willingness to use terror as part of its asym­
metric war strategy against India. Despite persistent pleas from India, the United States 
has not proven willing or able to bring suitable pressure to bear on Pakistan to dismantle 
an extensive terror network. At most, US officials have been willing to publicly state that 
Pakistan’s intelligence services have been involved in supporting terrorist attacks on Indi­
an diplomatic and other assets in Afghanistan (Mazzetti and Schmitt 2008).
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Third and finally, a segment of Indian domestic opinion and specifically those on India’s 
political left, remain deeply skeptical about a US–India strategic partnership. Even 
though their political salience is clearly waning, they nevertheless constitute an impor­
tant stumbling block along the pathway toward robust Indo-US strategic cooperation. In a 
related vein, another segment of India’s attentive public, though not explicitly on the ide­
ological left, also looks askance at enhancing strategic (p. 155) cooperation with the Unit­
ed States on the putative grounds that it would compromise India’s commitment to strate­
gic autonomy.
These constraints notwithstanding, Indo-US strategic cooperation has moved forward, al­
beit fitfully, since the Cold War’s end. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to carefully 
summarize the various steps that have been taken to promote such cooperation. Howev­
er, the United States, despite its reliance on Pakistan especially after the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September 2001, and its subsequent ventures on the ground in Afghanistan, has 
sought to court India principally as a potential strategic hedge against the PRC.
Clearly with an eye toward eliciting India’s cooperation, the Bush administration had cho­
sen to overturn a decades-long policy of seeking to induce India to dispense with its nu­
clear weapons program. To that end, it expended considerable domestic as well as inter­
national political capital to forge a civilian nuclear agreement with India (Ganguly and 
Mistry 2006). Unfortunately, from the US standpoint, this attempt to engage India 
through the lifting of a range of sanctions related to its nuclear infrastructure did not re­
sult in a wider, cooperative strategic relationship (Burns 2007). Given the constraints of 
India’s domestic politics, the strong streak of independence that permeates India’s politi­
cal culture, and the lingering memories of the US involvement with Pakistan during a sig­
nificant segment of the Cold War years, all act as important constraints on the deepening 
of the Indo-US strategic partnership.
Might some of these factors lose their salience in the years ahead? It is difficult to pro­
vide a definitive answer to this question. Though much progress has been made in Indo- 
US relations over the past decade, political attitudes within India do not change swiftly. 
That said, three important developments are likely to shape the future of US–India strate­
gic cooperation.
First, such cooperation will depend on the scope and pace of the US drawdown in 
Afghanistan after 2014. Indian policy-makers, quite understandably, are concerned that 
the end of the US military presence in Afghanistan may well open the floodgates to the 
expansion of Pakistan’s military influence within that country and the possible return of a 
neo-Taliban regime. Such an outcome could well have significant adverse consequences 
for India’s standing in the country and once again make it a haven for various anti-Indian 
terrorist organizations.
Second, a great deal depends on India’s own reactions to the US ‘rebalancing’ strategy 
toward Asia. Thus far, India’s policy-makers have expressed limited enthusiasm for this 
strategic shift despite an overt US attempt to make common cause with India. Though 
quietly pleased with the US interest in refocusing its attention to Asia, India’s policy-mak­
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ers simply do not wish to become a strategic surrogate for the United States as it seeks to 
address possible Chinese revanchist behavior in Asia (Ricks 2014).
Third and finally, much depends on how the US–India defense cooperation efforts evolve. 
Most recently, the US policy-makers were disappointed with India’s decision to award the 
contract for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft to Dassault Aviation of France (Clark 
2012). According to a knowledgeable source, the decision was made solely on technical 
grounds after a careful scrutiny of the capabilities of the various (p. 156) competitors for 
the lucrative contract (Tellis 2011). However, there is some lingering sentiment in US pol­
icy-making circles that it was politically untenable to award the contract to the United 
States in the wake of several other recent large ticket weapons sales agreements.
In the past, defense cooperation has been hobbled because of US unwillingness to trans­
fer technology to India. However, this reluctance may now be finally ending. In Septem­
ber of 2013, the outgoing US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, offered a 
glimpse into what may constitute a significant departure from past US practices. Specifi­
cally, on a visit to India he suggested that the two countries might wish to co-develop the 
next-generation Raytheon-Lockheed Martin FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank guided missile and 
also the Electro Magnetic Aircraft Launch System for the Indian navy’s future aircraft 
carriers (Hardy and Bedi 2013). If these or other joint projects come to fruition they 
would mark a dramatic departure from past limitations on defense cooperation and pro­
vide a solid foundation for robust US–India defense cooperation and thereby help meet 
many of India’s extant defense technology needs.
Russian Federation
India had enjoyed a mostly untroubled strategic partnership with the Soviet Union during 
much of the Cold War and especially after the early 1970s. This relationship, though quite 
beneficial in terms of weapons acquisitions, was not entirely bereft of costs. India, for ex­
ample, felt compelled to maintain a studied public silence on the Soviet invasion and oc­
cupation of Afghanistan because of its acute dependence on both Soviet markets and 
arms transfers. Subsequently, India’s decision, apparently at the behest of the Soviet 
Union, to support the Vietnamese-supported regime of Heng Samrin in Cambodia (Kam­
puchea) proved costly in terms of India’s quest to obtain observer status with the Associa­
tion of South-East Asian Nations.
The Cold War’s end significantly attenuated this relationship. As the Soviet Union started 
to slowly unravel, President Mikhail Gorbachev made clear that he was no longer willing 
to uncritically offer diplomatic and strategic support to India on issues of importance. 
Matters worsened considerably under Boris Yeltsin who evinced scant interest in India.
Indeed, the Indo-Russian strategic relationship has not been fully revived under President 
Vladimir Putin. Though it has been resuscitated, few Indian policy-makers entertain any 
expectations that it can be restored to its Soviet era status. Instead, it is now on a nar­
rower footing, focused primarily on a renewed arms transfer relationship but one hardly 
free from various troubles. India and Russia are developing a fifth-generation aircraft and 
India’s National Security
Page 13 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: Indiana University - Bloomington; date: 26 October 2020
co-producing the Brahmos missile. In November 2013, India finally took receipt of the re­
tooled aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov (renamed INS Vikramaditya) after substantial de­
lays and cost overruns (Pandit 2013). Obviously, given the long history of the arms trans­
fer relationship with the former Soviet Union, India will not be able to promptly end its 
dependence on the principal successor state, Russia. Furthermore, some domestic con­
stituencies, which have worked for an extended time span with their (p. 157) Russian 
counterparts may argue that the Soviet Union was and Russia remains a more reliable 
supplier than the United States or other Western powers, the troubles with the aircraft 
carrier notwithstanding.
Conclusion
After six decades of independence, India’s record on its national security policies 
presents distinctly mixed results. It has, barring the debacle of the 1962 Sino-Indian bor­
der war, managed to fend off attempts to challenge its territorial integrity. It has also 
managed to ward off internal secessionist threats even though, as argued, a number of 
them persist.
The country has created a defense industrial base but its ability to deliver products that 
meet the expectations of the armed forces has frequently fallen short. These state-run in­
dustries have also proven to be hopelessly inefficient in the use of allocated funds and are 
known for cost overruns on any number of projects. In the absence of greater institution­
al accountability or the introduction of substantial private competition it is hard to envis­
age that the sector can be reformed to ensure that it can demonstrate greater institution­
al efficacy.
Finally, though the country chose to end its policy of nuclear ambiguity in 1998, it has yet 
to fashion a wholly coherent nuclear strategy. Instead, despite the professed commitment 
to a ‘credible minimum deterrent’, its nuclear forces are expanding in a fashion that hard­
ly appears compatible with such a professed goal. The country’s failure to forthrightly 
tackle this component of its national security apparatus leaves it exposed to considerable 
risk given the sheer significance of a nuclear deterrent.
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Notes:
(1.) The term ‘appeasement’ is used here in the pre-Munich sense of the term. See 
Kennedy (1989).
(2.) A document that was declassified in 2013 revealed an infelicitous dimension of the In­
dian army role during the ‘police action’ that led to the integration of the Princely State 
of Hyderabad into the Indian Union. See Thompson (2013).
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